ABSTRACT In this paper, an aggregator-assisted model for machine-to-machine (M2M) communications is proposed. The data aggregator plays the role of a third party that transmits aggregated M2M data to a cognitive operator, which does not own the radio spectrum but rather leases it from a spectrum owner. In the studied system, the cognitive operators for machine services are considered to dynamically appear in the network and compete with one another, each of them having uncertain backhual M2M data traffic. The aggregator can then decide to select one operator with whom to set up either a long-term (LT) or a short-term (ST) service relationship, by anticipating the result of the auction in the second period. Under an ST relationship, the aggregator maintains the option of switching to a new operator in the next period, thereby incurring possible packet losing costs. In contrast, with an LT relationship, the aggregator commits to an operator over a long period of time, but may loss the opportunities to choose an operator with a possible lower operation cost. The optimal decision that maximizes the aggregator's expected utility is derived. The proposed M2M access model allows the aggregator accounting for both the switching cost for M2M communications, and, the benefit of a long-term service contract. Moreover, it is shown that an LT relationship may induce a higher accessed number of machines than an ST relationship when the cost of switching between operators is relatively high. Simulation results show that the spectrum sharing for the aggregator-assisted M2M model can significantly increase the number of accessed machines in a certain time duration, as well as bring extra revenues for the spectrum owner, the operator, and the aggregator.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine type devices that function without direct human intervention are rapidly becoming an integral part of our lives [1] , [2] . In this regard, recent standards suggest that a single cell of a wireless cellular system needs to support about 30,000 machine-to-machine (M2M) connections in 10 to 60 seconds [3] . Supporting the massive data traffic stemming from M2M communications over cellular systems requires overcoming several key challenges such as the lack of control channel resources and the potential congestion on the radio access channel (RACH) and the backhaul [4] , [5] . Access class barring (ACB) schemes such as those proposed in [6] allow the base station (BS) to delay M2M communications from initiating radio access, thereby alleviating the congestion over the spectrum. M2M traffic is also typically distinct from H2H communications by the short payload transactions [7] . Hence, link adaptation techniques with sophisticated channel estimation and reporting procedures will induce a large overhead for M2M communications [8] . In order to enhance the communication efficiency with energy limited MTDs, a key strategy is to utilize data aggregation. In [9] - [11] , the group-based and unified scheduling schemes in which the BSs associate with one or more device classes, are proposed to effectively use the RACH resources. A client relay scheme is proposed in [12] to improve the link reliability and energy efficiency for MTDs. The authors in [13] introduced a queueing model for performance modeling and analysis for heterogeneous M2M communications. The works [14] , [15] studied the energy-efficient design for data aggregation in heterogeneous M2M networks.
Nonetheless, all of the above schemes rely on allocating spectrum within the limited bandwidth of a licensed operator which may not be enough to support to support dense MTD deployments in future wireless networks. As discussed in [16] , another promising solution for the air interface of M2M communication lies in the use of cognitive radio (CR) access models. More recently, the work in [17] proposed cognitive medium access control (MAC) protocols to use secondary spectrum in cognitive M2M networks. A new opportunistic MAC scheme is proposed in [18] to allow M2M communications use Wifi white spaces. However, the schemes rely on the spectrum sensing ability of MTDs, and, will also increase the complexity and energy consumption of the devices. Introducing a data aggregator for spectrum leasing will not require any sensing ability at the M2M devices level. Also, the aggregator is in charge of transmitting the network control information with the operator, the MTDs will only be required to perform short transmissions and, thus, they can reduce energy consumption.
There have been significant current research efforts in the context of cognitive mobile virtual networks (CMVN) where virtualization refers to the fact that the cognitive operator does not own the spectrum bands, but, can obtain spectrum resource through the dynamic spectrum leasing from the spectrum owner [19] - [22] . All those results relied on a dynamic short-term negotiation process with the spectrum owner. Compared with a traditional long-term spectrum leasing contract used by FCC [22] , such dynamic leasing schemes allow a CMVN operator to adjust its leasing decisions to match the changes of users' demand at every small time scale.
Indeed, all those spectrum access schemes mainly concerned about a limited number of information-rate sensitive users and assumed a fix number of virtual operators. Also, periodically initiating negotiation processes may not effectively supports M2M transmissions which usually have access channel congestions, thus, may result in collisions and delays for M2M communications. On the other hand, as trillions of M2M devices will be connected to further wireless networks, it is easily envisioned the number of virtual operators who provide various services will be rapidly growing [24] - [26] . Thus, if a long-term spectrum leasing contract is used, the dynamic number of virtual operators in the network should be characterized.
The main contribution of this paper is to design a spectrum leasing mechanism for cognitive M2M communications, accounting for both the impacts of switching in a short-term leasing scheme and setting up a long-term service relationship. The data aggregator will select an operator to transmit the aggregated M2M data to it. The selected operator leases the spectrum from the owner. Then, it can sublease the spectrum to the aggregator for the purpose of enabling the M2M communications to access the wireless channel. Cognitive virtual operators are assumed to appear in the network over time and compete with each other to setup a service relationship with the aggregator. After the accessing of MTDs, the operator needs to route each device's data to the corresponding server. There will be heavy data exchanges (including of the signaling exchange and MTDs data forwarding) between the operator and M2M servers. The data exchange costs of operators are uncertain to the aggregator. Thus, the selection of operator can be modeled by using an auction mechanism.
In particular, we study two kinds of relationships between the operator and the data aggregator. In a long-term relationship, the aggregator commits to an operator through a longterm contract. In contrast, in a short-term relationship, the aggregator keeps the option of switching to a newly opened operator in future. Switching to a newly operator may incur delays for M2M communications, but, has the possibility to earn more profit due to the increasing competition between operators that appear in future. In the proposed framework, we will show what kind of relationship can be optimal for the aggregator, by analyzing the auction mechanism over two periods. Specifically, the solution of the auction is a numerically derived non-linear menu of contracts for the aggregator. Each contract encompasses the amount of the RACH band that will be allocated, the operator with which the relationship will be formed, and the type of this relationship. We compare the two service relationships for the aggregator, and show that the switching cost will impact the relationship choice. Moreover, we examine how the aggregator's optimal decision influences the system profit.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents an overview of the system model and describes the problems. Section III formulates the cost functions and the auction mechanisms. Section IV investigates the aggregator and the operator's profits for two periods and addresses the relationship management issues for the aggregator. Section V examines how the aggregator's optimal decision influences the system profit, while Section VI discusses the numerical results and analysis. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL A. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 1) OPERATORS
We consider an M2M network with one data aggregator and multiple cognitive virtual operators in the network. Here, a cognitive operator is one that does not own the spectrum band, but, instead, could lease the required spectrum from an owner. Hence, in such a scenario, multiple virtual operators do not mean multiple networks of different frequent bands. In order to provide M2M service, the aggregator will select an operator to forward the M2M data to it, as illustrated in Fig.1 .
The operator associated with the aggregator leases a bandwidthW from the owner that will be used as the RACH resource for a certain time duration. There is a one time unit prepayk from the operator to the owner for the reserved spectrum bandwidth. Let T (W , τ ) be the number of successful M2M connections in each interval τ . We assume that a fixed modulation scheme is used for machine data transmissions. The aggregator selects an operator to setup a service relationship. The operator leases the spectrum from the owner, and subleases it to the aggregator for machine-type devices (MTDs) radio accessing.
Following the access phase, each M2M device occupies a certain bandwidth w m that is used to transmit a small-sized data packet. For instance, considering the LTE system, when 16-QAM is adopted, each physical resource block (RB) that is comprised of 180 KHz on-demand bandwidth and 1 ms time slot, can carry about 0.4 kbits [8] .
The operator sets an M2M data gathering interval τ during which MTDs transmit traffic data to the aggregator every τ seconds by using an on-demand band which has a unit pricez. When the aggregator has aggregated the M2M data, it must transmit this data to the operator through a wireline or wireless interface. For instance, the operator can also use the on-demand band to gather data from the aggregator. The total on-demand band cost paid from the operator to the owner in a gathering interval would be T (W , τ ) · w m ·z.
2) UNCERTAIN DATA EXCHANGE COST
After receiving the aggregated data, the operator needs to route each M2M device's data to the corresponding server. There will be heavy signaling exchanges and MTDs data forwarding between the operator and M2M servers. Thus, another major concern for the operation of M2M communications is the data congestion in the backhaul between the operator and the M2M servers [27] . We consider that the average data process timeq i of operator i follows an exponential distribution 1 with parameter
As shown in Fig. 2 , distinct operators have different load states, thus have different average data processing times. We define the operation cost of an operator serving T (W , τ ) devices as α ·q i · T (W , τ ) where α is a cost constant. Hence, the total operation cost of operator i in a gathering interval is (w m ·z + α ·q i )T (W , τ ). Let 0 ≤q i ≤q. Here,q can be interpreted as a delay upper bound. When the service time exceeds such a bound, the quality-of-service (QoS) will be degraded and the revenue from M2M communications is lost. 
FIGURE 3.
The RACH in general is defined by the time-frequency resources, referred to as radio access (RA) slots. After MTDs accessing, the aggregator will use an on-demand band to gather data from MTDs.
3) M2M AGGREGATOR
The aggregator aggregates the M2M traffic in its coverage at unit price r for each M2M device. The aggregator broadcasts a beacon at the beginning of each gathering interval. Upon receiving such a beacon, MTDs start performing their random access protocol. The average number of demands for M2M communication in each gathering interval is m d . For random access, we use a standard Slotted Aloha (SA) scheme. The expected throughput of the classical SA is Ge −G where G is the average number of packets sent per slot [28] . Each device transmits to the aggregator a randomly selected access preamble sequence on RACH. No collisions will occur if multiple devices simultaneously transmit a different preamble sequence on the same RA slot. An example to illustrate the RACH resource is plotted in Fig. 3 . Denote the number of available preamble sequences as x s . The bandwidth of an SA slot is w a . In the time domain, the duration of the SA slot is t a . For example, x s = 64, w a = 1.08 MHz and t a = 2 ms in an LTE system [23] . Note thatW (number of packets/slot). The unit of the throughput of the SA protocol is (number of successful accessed devices)/slot. Then, the average number of successfully accessed MTDs in each gathering interval, T (W , τ ), is
4) RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE AGGREGATOR AND THE OPERATOR
In order to account for the switching impact on the dynamic spectrum allocation for M2M communications, we consider 5664 VOLUME 5, 2017 a two-period dynamic environment in which new operators may appear in the network during the second period. Specifically, we study the network model with one aggregator and multiple CR operators. At the beginning of the first period, the aggregator must decide whether to establish a long-term (LT) or a short-term (ST) relationship with an operator. The length of an LT relationship is considered to equal to the RACH spectrum commitment with the owner. In a LT relationship, the aggregator commits to a single operator, chosen in the first period, for both periods. In contrast, in an ST relationship, the aggregator is allowed to switch operators in the second period in which the RACH band invested by the operator will be transferred to the aggregator with a unit discounted pricek t . Notice, the long-term commitment is assumed to last two periods, then, the impact of one switching on dynamic selection of operators will be specifically analyzed. A multiswitching scenario is currently not investigated here, and will be subject of future research. Each period can contain several data gathering intervals. Without loss of generality, we normalize the number of data gathering intervals in the first period to 1. Then, the number of data gathering intervals in the second period is set to θ, θ > 0. We further normalize the system parameters as follows:
The normalized RACH band is the number of RA slots multiplied by x s . Both the normalized z and αq i have the same unit ''cost''. We further normalize αq i to q i . Define
The system main notations are shown in Table I .
B. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In the studied model, an operator not only competes with other operators in the same period but also with operators that emerge (with different operation costs) in the future. The information about the data processing cost of an operator is not fully available to the aggregator. Accordingly, as discussed next, the interaction between operators and the aggregator in the time horizon is modeled by a twoperiod reverse auction mechanism [29] . By predicting the outcome of the two-period auction and accounting for the impact of switching, the aggregator can select an operator and determine the RACH bandwidth, spectrum pricing and the service relationship with the operator at the beginning of the first period, as shown in Fig. 4 . In the proposed auction mechanism, the aggregator will be modeled as a buyer who offers each seller (operator) a set of auction contracts, with each contract corresponding to a profile of operators' costs. The operation cost of each operator is a private information, operators then bid their operation costs based on the auction profile.
We use the reverse auction to model the interaction between operators and the aggregator for the following reasons. First, as we consider a monopoly model with one aggregator and multiple operators, the reverse auction can entail an optimal auction mechanism for the aggregator. Second, the reverse auction just needs one competitive bidding process, and, will result in lower auction procurement costs compared with conventional auction bidding dynamics. Finally, the reverse auction can enforce the operator to reveal the truthful operator cost, thus, can facilitate the aggregateor to determine the ex-ante spectrum investment.
We use the subscripts l and s represent LT and ST, respectively. In the second period of an LT relationship, the aggregator offers the incumbent operator (denoted by I ) an auction contract profile
is the probability that the incumbent operator wins the auction 2 and
is the unit data revenue for the operator if its reported operation cost isĉ I 2 . Specifically, the auction rules of the proposed auction mechanism can be described as follows.
• Step 1-Period 2 with an LT relationship: The aggregator offers the incumbent operator an auction contract profile
} which is a solution to the problem (2). Then, the incumbent operator will bidding its true operation cost.
• Step 2-Period 2 with an ST relationship: The aggregator offers the incumbent and entrant operators an auction contract profile {w
s,2 (·)} which is a solution to the problem (4). Then, the operators will bidding their true operation costs.
• Step 3-Period 1 with an LT relationship: The aggregator offers the auction profile
is the RACH bandwidth investment decision. Then, the operators will bidding their true operation costs.
• Step 4-Period 1 1 with an ST relationship: The aggregator offers the auction profile {W i s (·), w i s,1 (·), p i s,1 (·)} according to Theorem 2, where W i s (·) is the RACH bandwidth investment decision. Then, the operators will bidding their true operation costs.
•
Step 5-The decision of the aggregator: By anticipating the results of the auctions in period 2, the aggregator can make decisions about the kind of service relationship with the operator at the beginning of period 1. 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED AUCTION MECHANISM FOR THE RELATIONSHIP CHOICE
The sequence of events in the studied spectrum sharing process are illustrated in Fig. 5 . This section first analyzes the operator and the aggregator's costs in the second period for LT and ST relationships in the auction mechanism. Subsequently, we examine the decision of the aggregator in the first period, by anticipating the future profit obtained in the second period. The auction mechanism will be designed to be optimal for the aggregator, which implies that no other auction mechanism can give higher expected utility to the aggregator.
A. AUCTION FORMULATION FOR THE SECOND PERIOD 1) LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP
Assume that the invested RACH capacity in the first period is W . The incumbent operator can be viewed as the only bidder in the second period of an LT relationship. Let
Then, Q is the average number of accessed devices in the second period, which also represent the average aggregated data amount. As a result, the revenue of operator relies on Q, thus, is directly related to the accessing delay. In the formulation, the revenue of the operator is used to measure the cost for accessing delay. For instance, as the number of accessed devices reduces, the revenue of the operator also reduces.
Here, we note that the M2M auction-based access mechanism for M2M networks is used between the operators and the aggregator. The one time unit prepayk for leasing the spectrum band from the owner to the operator is assumed to be a common information, thus it is not included in the auction. Moreover, the unit price of the RACH bandwidth allocated to the aggregator will be determined byŵ I l,2 . The operator's profit can then be expressed as,
if it reportsĉ I 2 while its true cost is c I 2 . For notation brevity, let u l,2 = u l,2 (c I 2 , c I 2 , W ). The unit M2M data revenue for the aggregator is denoted as r. Therefore, the aggregator's decision problem in the second period of an LT relationship is,
where
means that when the operator reports its cost truthfully, it obtains the maximum profit. Thus, the incentive compatible (IC) constraint can ensure that the operator reports truthfully. The individual rationality (IR) condition guarantees that the operator will achieve non-negative profit from participation. 3 Let
be the ex-ante profit of the operator in the second period of an LT relationship.
2) SHORT-TERM RELATIONSHIP
If an ST relationship is chosen, the aggregator can switch operators in the second period. We use the symbol E to denote the entrant operators.
] be the cost vector of the incumbent operator and all new entrants in the second period, where c E,0 2 corresponds to the cost of incumbent operator, and there are n 2 new entrant operators. In order to unify the notation in an ST relationship, we set c
The set of operators in the second period is denoted as
] be the vector of all operators except operator j, and c
]. Depending on the normalized RACH band W , the aggregator offers an auction profile {w
s,2 (·)} to the incumbent and entrant operators, where j ∈ N 2 . Given all operators bidsĉ E 2 in the second period, the probability that operator j wins the bidding isp
). If the incumbent operator loses the bidding, the RACH band is transferred to the aggregator with a normalized unit price k t . Also, we assume that there is a switching cost c s that captures the cost incurred for the aggregator by changing operators. 4 For notation brevity, let u E,j s,2 
Here,
s,2 is the band transfer revenue to the incumbent operator. Define,
Then, the aggregator's decision problem in the second period is formulated as, 
where u E,j 0 is a constant value andp
Assuming the RACH capacity W to be given from the first period, the expressions for the incumbent and entrant operator's second-period expected profitsû I l,2 ,û
(equations 1 and 3), and expressions for the aggregator's second period profitsπ l,2 ,π s,2 (equations 2 and 4) are both obtained. Then, the aggregator's first period decisions for LT and ST relationships will be: to maximize its profits over the entire horizon, taking the second period optimization as an embedded problem. Some simplified notations are summarized in Table 2 . 
If operator i bids/reportsc i 1 with true cost c i 1 and all other operators bid truthfully, the total expected profit of operator i over two periods in ST and LT relationships can be expressed as,
where α s = 1 and α l = 0 and the sum part represents the utility that operator i gets as an entrant in the second period. Let g i x = (r − w i x,1 (c 1 ))Q 1 . Then, the aggregator's optimal decision in the first period can be formulated as:
The auction mechanism design problems for the aggregator over two periods have been formulated in (2), (5) and (9) .
Next, we will first analyze the optimal mechanism solutions in the second period for each relationship, and then characterize the optimal solution in the first period.
Remark 1:
In the proposed the reverse auction, the auction contract profile {w I l,2 (·), p I l,2 (·)} designed by the aggregator will make the operators truthfully report their individual operation costs. In this sprit, the auction mechanism is also called incentive compatible (IC). Theorem 1 provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for the IC condition of the aggregator's problem (4) in the second period. Then, based on Theorem 1, the aggregator can solve the aggregator's problems in order to obtain the IC auction profile {w
Specifically, Propositions 1 and 2 identify the IC auction profile for the second period auction in the longterm relationship and short-term relationship, respectively. Similarly, the aggregator can design the contract profile
} to solve the aggregator's problem (7) in the first period (Proposition 3).
IV. OPTIMAL DECISION OF THE AGGREGATOR
The solution of the proposed auction-based access mechanism in the first period will specify the size of the RACH bandwidth to be purchased, and the unit revenue of aggregated M2M data to be obtained by the operator. In the second period, the solution only specifies the unit price, with the RACH capacity given in the first period. This section first studies the optimal solutions of the auction mechanisms for both ST and LT relationships in the second period. By anticipating the outcomes of the auction in the second period, the optimal profit of the aggregator can then be identified in the first period.
A. THE AUCTION SOLUTION IN THE SECOND PERIOD
Next, in Proposition 1, we will derive the second-period profit of the aggregator in an LT relationship. We then show Proposition 2 which is related to the switch threshold for an ST relationship. Then, Proposition 3 presents the aggregator's profits for an ST relationship. Once the solutions are obtained in the second period, the aggregator can choose the preferred type in the first period by comparing the profits of two relationships.
Proposition 1: In the second period of an LT relationship, given RACH bandwidth W , the expected second-period profit of the aggregator is,
and the expected second-period profit of the associated operator is,
Proof: See Appendix B. Next, we analyze the optimal results for the second period of an ST relationship. We will show that the solutions are quite related to the switching cost c s . To this end, we first present the following remark.
Remark 2: Assume that x i is exponentially distributed with mean 
Let F * n (y) denote the cumulative probability function of Y and f * n (y) be the density function.
Proposition
Proof: See Appendix C. Due to the fact that T (x) is a super function, the analytical solution cannot be got. The expressions of the expected second-period profit of the aggregatorπ s,2 (W ) and the incumbent operator profitū s,2 (W ) with the ST relationship are presented equations (22) and (23), respectively. Specifically, when c s = 0, we can get the analytical expressions of π s,2 (W ) andū s,2 (W ) as shown in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: Given a RACH bandwidth W and c s = 0, the expected second-period profit of the aggregator in an ST relationship is,
Proof: See Appendix D. Note that c s is cost that an aggregator incurs for switching operators. Observe that the total system profitπ s,2 (W ) + u s,2 (W ) = (a 2 (n 2 ) +ā 2 (n 2 ))Q is irrelevant to the band transfer cost k t . This means that when the aggregator selects a new entrant operator, the price k t W is transferred from the aggregator to the incumbent operator, thus will not reduce the system profit.
B. SOLUTION OF THE AUCTION IN THE FIRST PERIOD
Given the optimal second period solution, the first period auction must be designed to maximize the aggregator's total expected profit over time. The contract solution for the first period auction will also address the allocation of RACH spectrum over the whole time horizon. Let c i * 1 be the lowest 5668 VOLUME 5, 2017
cost of operators in the first period. Define,
Then, the optimal mechanism in the first period is characterized in the following proposition:
Theorem 2: Let i * = arg min i∈N 1 c i 1 . In both LT and ST relationships, the aggregator selects in the first period the operator with the lowest data processing cost. The expected profit of the aggregator over two periods can be expressed as,
x ∈ {s, l} represents LT and ST relationships, respectively.
Proof: See Appendix E. From Theorem 2, given the operator's cost c i 1 and RACH resource W , the profit of the aggregator in the first period is,
Then, the expected profit of the aggregator in the first period isπ x,1 (W ) = E c i *
is the optimal RACH capacity committed with the spectrum owner.
Remark 3: Note that from equation (11), we can see that the incumbent operator's expected profit in the second period is included in the aggregator's first period profit. In other words, in the first period the aggregator can capture ex ante the second period information of the incumbent by lowering the first period price. This happens because an operator will accept any price for setting up M2M service with the aggregator in the first period that generates him non-negative expected profits over two periods. Therefore, anticipating the incumbent operator's second-period profit, the aggregator can accordingly lower by the same amount the payment offered to an operator in the first period.
Define
. Based on Theorem 2 and Propositions 1 and 3, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 1: Given a RACH bandwidth W and c s = 0, the expected profits of the aggregator by selecting an ST relationship (π s (W )) and an LT relationship (π l (W )) are, respectively, expressed as, π s (W ) = a 1 (n 1 )Q 1 + b 1 (n 1 )kW , where, a 1 (n 1 ) = a 2 (n 1 ) + a 2 (n 2 ) +ā 2 (n 2 ). π l (W ) =ā 1 (n 1 )Q 1 + b 1 (n 1 )kW , wherē
V. THE IMPACT OF THE SWITCHING COST AND THE SYSTEM EFFICIENCY
Given the optimal auction solutions, we can now compare the performance of LT and ST relationships and identify the key factors that drive the difference. Also, we will examine how the aggregator's optimal decision influences the system profit by comparing the aggregator's optimal results to the maximum social welfare (MSW) solution.
A. THE IMPACT OF THE SWITCHING COST ON THE RELATIONSHIP SELECTION
This subsection first examines the relationship decision when c s = 0, then investigate the case with c s > 0 focusing on the impact of the switching cost. We will illustrate that the switching cost is driving force that lead the aggregator to setup an LT service relationship.
Theorem 3: When c s = 0, an ST relationship is always better than an LT relationship for the aggregator given RACH bandwidth W .
Proof: Let us define,
Then,
× (e −(n 2 +1)vq − e −(n 2 +2)vq ).
Next, we derivē
A n 2 = 2 + 2n 2 e −(n 2 +1)vq (n 2 + 1)(n 2 + 2)v · (n 2 + 2)v n 2 e −(n 2 +2)vq + (n 2 + 2)e −n 2 vq , = e vq (2e (n 2 +1)vq ) + 2n 2 (n 2 + 2)) (n 2 + 1)(n 2 + (n 2 + 2)e 2vq ) .
DefineĀ(x, n 2 ) = e x (2e (n 2 +1)x ) + 2n 2 (n 2 + 2)) − (n 2 + 1) (n 2 + (n 2 + 2)e 2x ). Note thatĀ(x, 0) = 0,
= 2x 2 e (n 2 +1)x e x + 4e x − 2e 2x − 2 ≥ 0. Then, we can getĀ(x, n 2 ) > 0, andĀ n 2 > 1. Thus, A n 2 +1 > A n 2 and π s (W ) − π l (W ) = (1 − e −n 1 vq )(a 1 (n 2 ) −ā 1 (n 2 ))Q 1 > 0 for any W . Moreover, with the increasing of the number of new entrant operators n 2 , the ST relationship achieves more benefits for the aggregator.
Although the two relationships may result in different RACH band capacities, π s (W )−π l (W ) reveals the factors that impact the relationship choice, given a certain RACH band investment. Based on Propositions 1, 2 and 3,
VOLUME 5, 2017 whereċ is the solution to
(·) is defined in Remark 2. According to (12) , the advantage of an ST relationship over an LT relationship is influenced by three factors. The first is the gain from efficiency improvement (the data processing cost reducing, c I 2 − c E,j * 2 ). Second, an ST relationship yields a switching cost for the aggregator. Third, by not committing to an operator, the aggregator lowers the incumbent operator's expected profits in the second period, which obviously results in less profits. These three effects jointly determine when an LT or an ST relationship is more profitable for the aggregator.
The following Proposition characterizes the impact of switching cost on the relationship decision. 
When c s →ĉ s (W ), c(c s , W ) → z +q, and hence
Since T (z +q) > 0, When switching is inexpensive (c s small), an ST relationship is better than an LT relationship. This corroborates the intuition that, for a small cost for switching, the likelihood that an aggregator changes operator becomes high (c s is low). Thus, the gain from the efficiency improvement is significant. This advantage of an ST relationship decreases with a higher switching cost. In other words, when switching is expensive, the relationship choice is reversed; an LT relationship will generate more profits than an ST relationship.
B. SYSTEM EFFICIENCY
Thus far, we have analyzed the optimal mechanisms of LT and ST relationships with the objective of maximizing the aggregator's profits. The system profit is defined as the total profit of the aggregator and selected operator. The price that the aggregator pays the operator is not a concern in this case, because it is transferred within the system. Thus, the system profit is just determined by the revenue of the M2M service and the operation cost of the operator. The maximum social welfare (MSW) solution will enable aggregator to switch to the lowest-cost entrant operator when the system profit from continuing with the incumbent operator is less than that from switching to the entrant operator, i.e., 
W , z}, otherwise stays with the incumbent operator.
2)c(c
is the lowest cost of the entrant operators. The aggregator switches to the entrant if and only if the profit from the entrant is higher than the profit from the incumbent, i.e, r − c In other words, the solution of the two-period auction model will give the new entrant operator an advantage over the incumbent. Moreover, the inefficient switching decision in the auction model benefits the aggregator because the auction model can utilize the information asymmetry, i.e., the operation cost of each operator are unknown to other operators.
In the first period, the aggregator always selects the lowestcost operator even with information asymmetry. Therefore, operator selection in the first period is system-efficient in the aggregator's optimal solution given W . Next, we compare the relationship choice decision. Note that if there is no information asymmetry in the second period, then the incumbent operator should expect zero second-period profit. Therefore, in the MSW solution, an LT relationship does not have the advantage of generating more profits as in the case with information asymmetry. As a result, we get, Proposition 5: If c s ≥ 0, in the MSW solution, a shortterm relationship is always better than a long-term relationship for the aggregator.
Proof: Then, if the profit from the optimal LT relationship is higher for the aggregator, then the aggregator can set the threshold entrant typec = z in an ST relationship so that no switching is allowable in the second period, and also follow the optimal LT relationship to set the RACH capacity level. In this way, the aggregator also constructs an ST relationship that is equivalent to the optimal LT relationship and brings a higher profit to the aggregator than the LT relationship. This conflicts the assumption.
In summary, when c s > 0 and there is information asymmetry, the aggregator's optimal decision deviates from the system-optimal solution in that 1) it favors too much the entrant operators in the second period of an ST relationship, 2) it leads to RACH band investment that is too low in an LT relationship, and 3) it may choose long-term commitment as the preferred relationship choice.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we run a number of simulations to verify our analytical insights.
A. PARAMETERS SETTING
The price rate for M2M communications varies in different countries. For instance, Vodafone offers an M2M data plan of 5 MB monthly for 3 months with 22.74$ in South America [33] . Each M2M transaction is set to 400 bits. Then, the average revenue from each data transmission is r = 0.06 cents. Recall that each accessed device is charged by a normalized unit price for normalized spectrum band. Each physical resource block (RB) consists of 108 KHz bandwidth and 1 ms time slot, can typically carry about 0.4 Kbits [8] , thus, each transmission is assumed to occupy a RB. We set θ = 1, then, the two periods have the same length. This allow us to focus on the analysis of the impact of switching. The unit price for the on-demand bandwidth is assumed to bez = 0.01 cents, which means 0.01 cents per 180 KHz per 1 ms. Unless otherwise stated, we use the parameters as follows, the unit price for the spectrum commitment with the owner k = 0.006 cents, the unit price for the transferred RACH capacity k t = 0.003 cents. We assume that the average signaling queue length of the operators follows an exponential distribution with a parameter of v = 0.2 (units of signaling processing time), thus, has an average queue length of 1 v = 5. The delay upper bound is set toq = 10 units of signaling process time. The value of signaling processing used here is an abstract value just for the analysis purpose. We first examine the scenario of c s = 0. Then, the cases of c s > 0 are analyzed. Fig. 6 shows the aggregator's profits for ST and LT relationships with different RACH capacity when c s = 0. As the normalized RACH capacity W (the number of RACH slots) varies from 4000 to 10000, the number of M2M connections that are successfully transmitted increases. However, the payment term k · W in (10) increases. Thus, the profit of the aggregator is concave and there will be an optimal RACH capacity decision for each relationship. Fig. 6 also shows that, as the number of new operators n 2 increases, the aggregator's profit will increase. The reason is that more serious competition between operators in the second period benefits the aggregator more in the auction. This figure corroborates the fact that the ST relationship is always better than the LT relationship for the aggregator no matter what the RACH capacity is, and the M2M traffic demand will not affect the relationship choice.
B. ANALYSIS OF THE AUCTION MECHNISM SOLUTION WITHOUT THE SWITCHING COST
Notice, we normalized the data gathering intervals in the first period to 1 for the analytic purpose, thus, the profits shown in the figure are seemingly small (in terms of cents). Indeed, the profit can be significant when a large number of data gathering intervals are implemented. Also, a number of aggregators can be deployed in a cell without overlapping with each other, this can also increase the revenues of operators. In Table 3 , the optimal RACH capacity allocation is shown for different spectrum commitment prices k and different VOLUME 5, 2017 M2M communications demand, i.e.,
The RACH band transfer price in an ST relationship is k t = 0.5k. We observe that, as m d varies from 1650 to 3300, the optimal allocated RACH band also increases. Recall that the unit price k for the leased spectrum from the owner is assumed to be common information. Thus, the owner is not included in the auction mechanism, and, the spectrum commitment price will be exogenously determined. Table 2 shows that a higher spectrum commitment price leads to a lower invested RACH capacity. Moreover, the RACH capacity commitment in a short term relationship is always higher than in a long term relationship. This is because varying from an LT relationship to an ST relationship, the profit increases higher than the increase of the cost of RACH spectrum. In Fig. 7 , we study numerically the profit of the aggregator and operator in two periods of an ST relationship when c s = 0. The LT relationship in this case is not a concern because the ST relationship is always better than the LT relationship for the aggregator and for the social welfare solution (See Fig. 6 and Proposition 5). According to the optimal auction mechanism presented in Theorem 2, the profit of the aggregator in the first period isπ s,
wherē u x,2 (W ) comes from anticipating the profit of the selected operator in the second period. In the simulations, we consider
as the achievable profit of the aggregator in the first period and we show in Fig. 7 the profits of aggregator and the operator in two periods. The number of operators in the first period n 1 = 3. By anticipating the profit of the operator's in the second period, the aggregator can design the auction mechanism in the first period. This implies that the optimal auction mechanism will favor the aggregator. Also, consistent with the insights revealed in Theorem 2, the results in Fig. 7 show that increasing entrant operators n 2 results in a higherπ x,2 and a lowerū x,2 due to the growing competitions between newly opened operators. Corresponding to the scenario of Fig. 7 , Table 4 shows the revenues of the aggregator and the payments by the aggregator in two periods. The revenue is related to the accessed MTDs, thus, is determined by the RACH capacity. We observe that as n 2 increases from n 2 = 3 to n 2 = 6, the revenues of the aggregator in two periods are almost same, this implies that the number of entrant operators in Period 2 has a quite small impact on the RACH capacity allocation in Period 1. However, more entrant operators lead a lower payment to the operator in the second period. Note that, the payment to the owner is finished at the beginning of the first period. Thus, in the second period, the payment to the owner is zero. In Fig. 8 , we study how the aggregator's optimal decision influences the average number of accessed machines by comparing the aggregator's optimal results to the MSW solution when c s = 0. Fig. 8 shows that that the aggregator's optimal decision will reduce the average number of accessed machines about 20 when n 2 = 5 compared to the MSW solution. This is due to the fact that maximizing the aggregator's profits reduces the allocation of RACH capacity. Such an inefficient switching decision benefits the aggregator because it lowers the anticipating profit of the operatorū x,2 in (11). As the incumbent operator's expected second period profit decreases, the payment decreases and the aggregator's profit in the first period increases. In practice, in order to get the MSW solution, a pricing scheme can be used to stimulate the aggregator choose the MSW solution. Fig. 9 shows how the choice of relationship changes when the switching cost is introduced to the system. Here, we compare the profit differenceπ s −π l . We observe that, when switching is inexpensive (i.e., c s < 50), an ST relationship is better than an LT relationship. The figure also shows that an LT relationship is beneficial for the aggregator if the switching cost is beyond a threshold and the benefit is most significant for moderately high switching costs. For example, when c s = 50,π s −π l is close to zero and continues to decrease as c s increases. This is because the net gain from switching is dominated by the advantage of an LT relationship resulting from operators' more aggressive bidding. When c s further increases, this advantage of an ST relationship becomes lower, because the switching profit in an ST relationship is reduced. In fact, when the switching cost is very high (i.e., c s > 300), an ST relationship reduces to an LT relationship because the aggregator will never switch even with the option of switching open. Recall that the switching thresholdc is the solution to
C. ANALYSIS OF THE CASES WITH SWITCHING COST
. Thus,ċ is determined by both the M2M access demand m 2 d and the optimal RACH capacity W . When m 2 d is larger than a certain value, as m 2 d increases, the thresholdċ will increase. Thus, the switching probability also increases in an ST relationship, and, the average profit of the aggregator increases lower than the increase of the switching cost.
In Table 5 , we maintain n 1 = 3 and show the profit of the aggregator (cents) for different switching cost c s . It is observed that the profit maintains a constant value in an LT relationship when the number of entrant operators n 2 varies, since the aggregator will not switch the operator in the second period. The table also illustrates that increasing n 2 only distinctly shifts the profit of the aggregator at which the switching cost is low. The reason is that, for a large switching cost, the profit of the aggregator is mainly determined by the switch probability. Fig. 10 further characterizes the impact of the switching cost on the switching probability in an ST relationship. We set the cost of the selected operator in period one c I 2 = z +z. In Fig. 10 , we can see that, as more new operators enter the market, the switching probability increases. However, when c s varies from 50 to 100, the probability reduces to nearly zero. Hence, in this case, the aggregator will require the entrant operator to be more efficient (has a low operation cost) so that it considers switching to it, and, the total gain from switching is able to cover the switching cost.
D. ANALYSIS OF THE ROBUSTNESS TO ESTIMATION ERRORS
The decision of the aggregator is not only related to the number of operators in period 2, but also depends on the number of devices in period 2. In practice, the reinforcement learning algorithms such as in [34] can be used to improve robustness to errors, however, the design of such schemes is beyond the scope of this paper. Fig. 11(a) shows that the relationship choice of the aggregator will also be not affected by the number of devices in period 2 when m 2 d is within the range of 1667 to 2667, and 4000 to 5000. As shown in Fig. 11(b) , the difference of invested RACH bandwidths at VOLUME 5, 2017 d is 3667, then RACH bandwidth invested by the aggregator will be 800 less than the optimal value. This will lead an average number of 3667 × (e − 3667 7100 − e − 3667 6300 ) = 139 devices to be delayed. Although the estimation errors may occur in practice, the developed model can serve as a building block for more elaborate, dynamic spectrum sharing mechanisms for M2M communications in future work.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed an aggregator-based M2M access model in which a cognitive virtual operator can lease RACH resource from a spectrum owner for a certain time duration to set up a service relationship with the aggregator. In particular, we have analyzed when a data aggregator should select a long-term relationship by committing to a single operator over a long period of time, or choose a short-term relationship by keeping the option open to switch to a new operator in the future. Toward this end, we have designed an optimal two-period auction-based access mechanism for the aggregator to setup a service relationship with an operator. We have studied the solution of the auction mechanism which is a numerically derived non-linear menu of contracts that specified the size of the RACH capacity, the unit M2M data revenue to be obtained by the operator, and the relationship choice (ST or LT relationship). We have compared the two service relationships for the aggregator, and have analyzed the impactors that will impact the relationship choice. In summary, this paper has introduced new techniques for M2M access with dynamic cognitive service operators, thereby enabling the efficient RACH resource allocation for spectrum sharing.
APPENDIX

A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: Let X be a normed and compact space and K ⊂ X . t is a relevant parameter. Define V (t) = max t∈K f (x, t) and x * (t) = arg max x∈K f (x, t). If the partial derivation of function f t (x, t) = ∂f (x,t) ∂t exists and is a continuous function of (x, t), then, based on the envelop theory [30] , for any x(t) ∈ x * (t), Following the similar argument, we can show that the same result for c <ĉ. Hence, the auction mechanism is IC for the operators. 
when the number of entrant operators is zero. Following Theorem 1, if the auction mechanism satisfies the IC condition, the ex-ante second period profit of the associated operator with a RACH band W is, 2 ) and f(c E 2 ) represents the joint probability density of the costs of the entrant operators. Let n 2 = {0, . . . , n 2 }. The aggregator will design the auction mechanism to select the operator with the highest V j with the probability 1, i.e., p ≤ċ ), the incumbent operator will still associate with the aggregator. Otherwise, the aggregator will select a new operator j * . Thus, the expected second-period profit of the aggregator is, (c)). Hence, the expected VOLUME 5, 2017
